The Big Picture View of Anonymous Tips from Ordinary People by Dadiego, Amanda M.
Touro Law Review 
Volume 32 Number 4 Article 8 
2016 
The Big Picture View of Anonymous Tips from Ordinary People 
Amanda M. Dadiego 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Fourth Amendment 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Dadiego, Amanda M. (2016) "The Big Picture View of Anonymous Tips from Ordinary People," Touro Law 
Review: Vol. 32 : No. 4 , Article 8. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss4/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For 
more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu. 
 807 
THE BIG PICTURE VIEW OF ANONYMOUS TIPS FROM 
ORDINARY PEOPLE 
 
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK 
People v. Argyris1 
(decided November 25, 2014) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people 
to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”2  The purpose is to protect individuals from being searched 
or arrested based upon mere suspicion or a rumor.3  A search or sei-
zure is reasonable, and therefore constitutional, when law enforce-
ment has reasonable suspicion or probable cause.  Courts throughout 
the country have been faced with the issue of whether anonymous 
tips that lead police to conduct a “stop and frisk” could be deemed 
constitutional.4  Anonymous tips can create a cause for concern when 
the informant uses law enforcement in an attempt to harass, black-
mail, or embarrass a potential defendant. 
This Case Note will discuss the issue presented to the New 
York State Court of Appeals in People v. Agryris—whether there was 
reasonable suspicion, to justify the search and seizure of the defend-
ant’s vehicle and firearm on the basis of an anonymous 911 phone 
call.  This Note will recommend that New York adopt a practical, to-
tality of the circumstances approach used by a majority of the states.5  
Section II will discuss the facts and procedural background of Ag-
 
1 27 N.E.3d 425 (N.Y. 2014). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
3 People v. Elwell, 406 N.E.2d 471, 480 (N.Y. 1980) (Jasen, J., dissenting). 
4 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990); 
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000); People v. Moore, 847 N.E.2d 1141 (N.Y. 2006); People 
v. Rios, 898 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cty. 2010). 
5 See infra note 244 (stating that only six states, including New York, apply the Aguilar-
Spinelli test). 
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ryris.  Section III will provide an overview and brief history of the 
doctrine of reasonable suspicion.  Section IV will address when an 
anonymous tip may serve as a basis for reasonable suspicion or prob-
able cause to justify a reasonable search or seizure.  Section V will 
address the background of New York law in relation to anonymous 
tips.  Finally, Section VI will apply the relevant law to the facts of 
Agryris. 
II. PEOPLE V. ARGYRIS 
A. Factual and Procedural Background 
On July 19, 2007, the police received a 911 phone call from 
an unidentified man.6  The caller explained to the operator that after 
exiting a building on New Town Avenue and 31st Street in Astoria, 
New York he witnessed four “big bully white guys” enter a new 
black Mustang.7  The caller provided the operator with the license 
plate number of the Mustang.8  He added that one of the men put a 
gun into the back of the vehicle and observed a gray van accompany 
the Mustang as it drove away.9  Next, the caller stated that the vehicle 
and the van went down the block and turned right.10  Although the 
caller described the gunman’s appearance as a “tall big bully white 
guy[],” the caller was unable to identify the defendant’s clothing or 
any other distinctive traits.11  The caller declined to reveal his identity 
to the operator.12  The 911 operator attempted to send police to meet 
the caller, but he left before the police arrived at the scene.13 
Approximately fifteen minutes after the call was made, Of-
ficer Castelli, a New York City police officer, located a black Mus-
tang with a matching license plate number.14  Castelli followed the 
Mustang and reported via radio to inform other officers.15  After re-
 
6 Argyris, 27 N.E.3d at 429 (Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring). 
7 Id.  
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Argyris, 27 N.E.3d at 429 (Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
2
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ceiving the radio report, Sergeant Bauso spotted the Mustang at a 
traffic light and left his vehicle to get a better look at the license plate 
number.16  Once he confirmed the license plate number, he pointed to 
the vehicle and instructed the driver to pull over.17  However, the 
driver failed to comply and Bauso returned to his vehicle to follow 
the Mustang.18  The Mustang continued to drive and parted ways with 
the van.19  Officer Valles spotted the Mustang, followed it, and called 
for backup.20  Valles exited his vehicle, pointed his gun at the Mus-
tang, and ordered the occupants to exit the vehicle.21  Sergeant Bauso 
and six other officers arrived on the scene and aimed their guns at the 
Mustang.22 
Officer Valles ordered the occupants to exit the vehicle one 
by one.23  The defendant, Costandino Argyris, an occupant in the 
Mustang, wore a bulletproof vest that was visible when he exited the 
vehicle.24  Officer Valles searched Argyris and discovered a metal 
and leather club along with a switchblade when he searched Ar-
gyris.25  Officer Valles searched the vehicle and discovered a loaded 
.38 caliber handgun under the driver’s seat, as well as a box of 9 mil-
limeter ammunition on the back seat.26 
Before the commencement of trial, the defendant moved to 
suppress the physical evidence recovered by police.27  The New York 
State Supreme Court Queens County ultimately denied the defend-
ant’s motion to reargue and the defendant entered a plea of guilty.28  
Next, the defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction.29  The 
New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment, emphasized that these circumstances did not require the appli-
cation of the Aguilar-Spinelli test because the standard of review is 
 
16 Argyris, 27 N.E.3d at 429 (Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Argyris, 27 N.E.3d at 429 (Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring). 
22 Id. at 429-30. 
23 Id. at 430. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Argyris, 27 N.E.3d at 430 (Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 431. 
29 Id. 
3
Dadiego: The Big Picture
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2016
810 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 32 
merely reasonable suspicion.30  The court determined that Officer 
Valles had a basis to suspect that the defendant may be in criminal 
possession of a weapon.31  The court found that reasonable suspicion 
was established from the anonymous informant accurately providing 
the police with (i) a description of the vehicle, (ii) license plate num-
ber, and (iii) the location of the vehicle in relation to where it was 
first spotted by the informant.32  The informant’s information was re-
liable, because it was a contemporaneous observation.33  The court 
stated that the police officers were justified in drawing their guns to 
ensure their safety when ordering the defendant to exit the vehicle.34  
Accordingly, the court held that the trial court properly denied the de-
fendant’s motion to suppress the physical evidence seized from the 
defendant’s person and vehicle.35 
B. The New York Court of Appeals Decision 
The New York Court of Appeals held that the police stop was 
lawful whether the court applied either the totality of the circum-
stances test or the Aguilar-Spinelli test.36  However, the Aguilar-
Spinelli test does not typically apply to situations regarding reasona-
ble suspicion.37  The court determined through a combination of the 
contents of the anonymous 911 call and the confirmatory observa-
tions from the police that reasonable suspicion was successfully es-
tablished.38  Reasonable suspicion was established because the anon-
 
30 Id. 
31 Argyris, 27 N.E.3d at 431 (Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring). 
32 Id.; Reasonable suspicion is defined as “a particularized and objective basis, supported 
by specific and articulable facts, for suspecting a person of criminal activity. Reasonable 
Suspicion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) defines  A police officer must have a 
reasonable suspicion to stop a person in a public place.”  In White, the Court stated  
[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause 
not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with 
information that is different in quantity or content than that required to 
establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion 
can arise form information that is less reliable than that required to show 
probable cause. 
White, 496 U.S. at 330; see supra Part I.B for a discussion of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. 
33 Argyris, 27 N.E.3d at 431 (Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 426. 
37 Id. at 427. 
38 Argyris, 27 N.E.3d at 426. 
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ymous 911 call contained sufficient information about the unlawful 
possession of a weapon.39 
Judge Smith’s concurring opinion considered whether Agui-
lar-Spinelli should be applied to stops that merely require reasonable 
suspicion.40  Before this case, Aguilar-Spinelli was traditionally ap-
plied to New York cases that faced the issue of probable cause, not 
reasonable suspicion.41  Smith noted, if Aguilar-Spinelli should be 
used to establish reasonable suspicion, the court would be obligated 
to establish that a reasonable person could suspect the informant had 
an adequate basis of knowledge and that knowledge stemmed from a 
credible or reliable source.42  Therefore, Judge Smith, along with four 
other judges, rejected the idea that Aguilar-Spinelli should be applied 
in circumstances that solely require reasonable suspicion because it 
would unnecessarily complicate reasonable suspicion issues.43 
III. REASONABLE SUSPICION 
A. Terry v. Ohio 
The leading case for law enforcement’s ability to “stop and 
frisk” suspicious individuals is Terry v. Ohio.44  In 1968, the United 
States Supreme Court was asked to examine a street confrontation be-
tween an individual and the police on the basis of suspicious circum-
stances.45  In Terry, an experienced detective stopped two men who 
were acting suspiciously in an area known for shoplifting and pick-
pocketing.46  The detective, Officer McFadden, patrolled the same vi-
cinity for 30 years.47  During his patrol, he observed three men acting 
suspiciously and started to follow them because he suspected that 
 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 427 (Smith, J., concurring). 
41 Id.  The court explained two New York Court of Appeals cases that mentioned Aguilar-
Spinelli to determine lack of probable cause.  People v. Landy, 452 N.E.2d 1185 (N.Y. 1983) 
(holding Aguilar-Spinelli rule established no probable cause); People v. Chase, 650 N.E.2d 
379 (N.Y. 1995) (holding lack of probable cause based on Aguilar-Spinelli). 
42 Argyris, 27 N.E.3d at 427 (Smith, J., concurring). 
43 Id. 
44 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
45 Id. at 4. 
46 Id. at 5. 
47 Id. 
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they were planning a robbery.48  He eventually approached the men 
and asked for their names and the men mumbled something in re-
turn.49  Officer McFadden then grabbed Terry, spun him around, pat-
ted him down outside of his clothes, and felt a pistol.50  After his ar-
rest for criminal possession of a firearm, Terry’s motion to suppress 
the pistol was denied.51 
The Supreme Court held that an objective standard must be 
used to decide whether there was probable cause to conduct a 
search.52  An objective standard is met when the facts presented to the 
officer at the time of the search created a belief that further investiga-
tion is necessary to address the potential criminal activity afoot.53  
The Court opted for a fact sensitive approach rather than creating a 
bright line rule.  The Court also explained that the officer did not 
need to be certain that the individual was armed.54  It was further not-
ed that a reasonably prudent person standard was appropriate when 
an officer believes his safety or that of the police is at jeopardy.55  
Accordingly, an officer may not act based on a suspicion, but rather 
on specific reasonable inferences derived from his experiences.56  Ul-
timately, the Court decided that the search in this situation was rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment.57 
B. Aguilar-Spinelli Test 
The Supreme Court developed the Aguilar-Spinelli test—a 
two-pronged test used to determine whether an informant’s tip pro-
vides probable cause.58  This test safeguards an individual’s Fourth 
 
48 Id. at 5-6.  In New York, under the De Bour test this would be considered Level 2 Rea-
sonable Suspicion.  People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1976). 
49 Terry, 392 U.S. at 6-7. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 21-22. 
53 Id. 
54 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 31. 
58 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 
Probable cause is defined as: 
A reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed or is com-
mitting a crime or that a place contains specific items connected with a 
crime.  Under the Fourth Amendment, probable cause—which amounts 
to more than a bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a 
6
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Amendment rights, and allows the police to utilize informant-based 
tips in certain situations.59  Under this test, a police officer must offer 
facts to verify the informant’s basis of knowledge and reliability for a 
search or seizure to be deemed constitutionality proper.60  The Su-
preme Court in Aguilar v. Texas created the two-pronged test to de-
termine when a “substantial basis” is present to obtain a warrant or 
conduct a warrantless search based upon an anonymous tip from an 
informant.61  The first prong, “basis of knowledge,” is satisfied when 
an informant obtains his knowledge through personal observation or 
in a reliable manner.62  The second prong, known as the veracity 
prong, requires an officer to provide facts necessary to establish that 
the informant possesses credibility or his information is reliable.63  
This can be simply satisfied with a showing that the informant has 
provided the police with accurate information in the past.64 
Five years after the Aguilar test was established, the Supreme 
Court refined and clarified the test in Spinelli v. United States.65  In 
Spinelli, the Court noted that a tip is based on an informant’s personal 
knowledge when he is able to give an accurate and detailed descrip-
tion of how the information was established or became known to 
him.66  If a tip fails to satisfy one or both of the prongs—probable 
cause may be established by a police investigation that relies the 
tip—to support an inference that the informant was a trustworthy 
source and that he obtained the information in a reliable way.67  If an 
officer wishes to rely on corroboration, the next step is whether the 
 
conviction—must be shown before an arrest warrant or search warrant 
may be issued. 
Probable Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
59 Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 112. 
60 Id. at 114. 
Magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances 
from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he 
claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from 
which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not 
be disclosed, . . . was ‘credible’ or his information ‘reliable.’ 
Id. 
61 Id. at 111. 
62 Id. at 114. 
63 Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114. 
64 Id. 
65 Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 410. 
66 Id. at 416. 
67 Id. at 418. 
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corroborative tip can pass the two-prong Aguilar test without inde-
pendent corroboration.68 
C. Totality of the Circumstances—Illinois v. Gates 
The United States Supreme Court abandoned the Aguilar-
Spinelli test fourteen years later in its ruling in Illinois v. Gates.69  In 
May of 1978, the Bloomingdale Police Department received an 
anonymous handwritten letter informing them that Lance and Susan 
Gates made their living by selling drugs.70  The letter revealed the lo-
cation of their condominium along with their method of obtaining 
drugs from Florida.71  The letter provided a detailed account of future 
conduct relating to the Gates’ involvement with drug trafficking.72 
Detective Mader investigated the tip and discovered that 
Lance’s license was registered to the same address provided in the 
letter.73  Further investigation revealed that Lance had an airline res-
ervation to Florida from Chicago.74  An agent with the Drug En-
forcement Administration reported to Mader that Lance was in Flori-
da and was in a hotel room registered to Susan.75  The next day Lance 
and an unidentified woman left the hotel in a vehicle registered to 
Gates in route to Chicago.76  Mader then submitted the anonymous 
letter to a judge to obtain a warrant to search the Gates’ vehicle and 
home.77  The actions that Gates took were the same as specified in the 
letter with the exception of an unidentified woman driving back to Il-
linois with him.78  The police were waiting at the Gates’ home and 
subsequently searched the vehicle’s trunk to discover 350 pounds of 
marijuana.79 
 
68 Id. at 416. 
69 Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. 
70 Id. at 225. 
71 Id.  
72 Id. The anonymous informant stated on May 3rd Susan would be diving their vehicle 
from Chicago to Florida and fly back home. Id.  The letter also stated that Lance would then 
pick up the vehicle and drive it from Florida back to Chicago with $100,000 worth of drugs 
in the trunk.  Gates, 462 U.S. at 225. 
73 Id. at 225-26. 
74 Id. at 226. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Gates, 462 U.S. at 226. 
78 Id. at 226-27. 
79 Id. at 227. 
8
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The Court abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli test and adopted a 
“totality of the circumstances” test to establish whether the inform-
ant’s tip was sufficient to establish probable cause.80  Probable cause 
is more demanding than reasonable suspicion for two reasons.81  
First, reasonable suspicion is determined with a different quantity or 
content of information than is required for probable cause.82  Second, 
probable cause requires a higher degree of reliability.83  In order to 
establish reasonable suspicion, quantity and quality are considered 
when evaluating “totality of the circumstances.”84  For example, if a 
tip lacks reliability then more information is required to establish rea-
sonable suspicion.85  The Court found that the Aguilar-Spinelli test 
was too demanding for a probable cause standard to be satisfied by 
law enforcement, and was also detrimental to the government’s legit-
imate interest in preventing crime.86  Importantly, the Aguilar-
Spinelli test could rarely be satisfied when judges were tasked with 
issuing search warrants—most likely because anonymous tips are 
usually submitted by the general public, that lack necessary infor-
mation to satisfy the basis of the knowledge prong—namely, the de-
mand for predictability.87  This is because individuals are sometimes 
unable to provide the extensive information necessary to satisfy the 
“basis of knowledge” and “reliability” prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli 
test.88 
As previously stated, Terry laid the foundation for “stop and 
frisks” and provided that a police officer might establish reasonable 
suspicion from his own observations.89  However, this rule does not 
consider what happens when tips come from anonymous sources.  An 
anonymous tip can support reasonable suspicion when the tip con-
tains predictive information.90  In order for a tip to give rise to rea-
sonable suspicion, it must be reliable in its assertion of illegality.91  
 
80 Id. at 238. 
81 White, 496 U.S. at 330. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). 
85 White, 496 U.S. at 330. 
86 Gates, 482 U.S. at 237-38. 
87 Id. at 230. 
88 Id. 
89 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31. 
90 See J.L., 529 U.S. at 269. 
91 Id. at 272. 
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The totality of the circumstances must be taken into account to de-
termine whether reasonable suspicion exists.92  For years, courts were 
asked to determine the issue of whether anonymous tips provided po-
lice officers with reasonable suspicion to conduct a lawful stop. 
IV. THE RULE OF REASONABLE SUSPICION IN ANONYMOUS TIPS 
A.  Alabama v. White 
The United States Supreme Court was faced with the issue of 
whether an anonymous tip, together with independent police work, 
presented sufficient indicia of reliability to provide the reasonable 
suspicion necessary to conduct an investigatory stop in the 1990 case, 
Alabama v. White.93  In White, the police received an anonymous tel-
ephone call that stated White would be leaving an apartment complex 
at a certain time and enter a particular vehicle.94  The call further stat-
ed that White would be going to a motel with an ounce of cocaine in 
a brown case.95  The police went to the apartment complex and wit-
nessed White enter a vehicle that matched the description from the 
anonymous tip and proceeded to travel to the motel.96  Shortly before 
arriving at the motel, police stopped the vehicle that was suspected of 
carrying cocaine.97  White consented to the search and the police 
found a brown case in the vehicle, which contained marijuana.98  Af-
ter arresting White, police found cocaine in her purse.99  White later 
challenged the search on the ground that the police lacked reasonable 
suspicion when they initially stopped and detained her. 
The Court applied the “totality of circumstances” approach 
and analyzed both what the police learned through personal observa-
tions along with the weight of the anonymous tip.100  To apply the to-
tality of the circumstances analysis, a court uses the same concept as 
 
92 White, 496 U.S. at 328-29. 
93 Id. at 326-27. 
94 Id. at 327. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 White, 496 U.S. at 327. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 328. 
10
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used to determine the level of reasonable suspicion.101  The Court 
noted that every tip from an anonymous source does not need to be 
verified.102  The woman’s name did not require verification because 
the location of the apartment complex and the vehicle were the same 
as described in the tip—thus, rendering the anonymous tip reliable.103  
The Court’s emphasized the importance of the source’s familiarity 
with the particulars of the defendant’s actions, because a member of 
the general public would not have been able to produce the detail that 
was provided in the tip.104  Here, the future behavior of the defendant 
was considered such as leaving the building, entering a particular ve-
hicle, and taking a direct route to the motel.105  This information 
could have only came from an individual who was familiar with the 
defendant’s routine and, therefore, had a sufficient basis of 
knowledge of the facts.106  The Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that 
when the officers stopped the defendant, the anonymous tip provided 
reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant was involved in 
criminal activity.107  Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment was not vi-
olated.108 
B.  Florida v. J.L. 
In Florida v. J.L., the United States Supreme Court was asked 
to determine whether an anonymous tip that an individual was carry-
ing a gun, without more information, was adequate to justify a police 
officer’s stop and frisk.109  In J.L., the police received an anonymous 
telephone call that reported a young black male, wearing a plaid shirt 
and carrying a gun, was at a particular bus stop.110  However, there 
was no information about the individual providing the tip and no au-
dio recording of the tip.111  The police went to the location and saw 
three young black males, one of whom was wearing the plaid shirt 
 
101 Id. at 328-29. 
102 White, 496 U.S. at 328. 
103 Id. at 331. 
104 Id. at 331-32. 
105 Id. at 331. 
106 Id. at 331-32. 
107 White, 496 U.S. at 332. 
108 Id. 
109 J.L., 529 U.S. at 268. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
11
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that was described.112  But, the officers did not suspect the three 
males of any illegal conduct.113  Furthermore, a firearm was not in 
sight and there were no threatening movements.114  One of the offic-
ers approached J.L. and ordered him to put his hands up, frisked him, 
and discovered a gun.115  J.L. was charged with carrying a concealed 
firearm without a license and possessing a firearm under the age of 
18.116  The defendant then moved to suppress the gun on the ground 
that the search was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.117  The 
Florida Supreme Court held that the search was invalid under the 
Fourth Amendment, because anonymous tips are less reliable than 
tips from a known informant and can only result in reasonable suspi-
cion when accompanied by specific indicia of reliability.118  In this 
case, the officer only had a common law right to question the indi-
vidual, not to search him.  Thus, the Florida Supreme Court found 
that the tip at issue provided no predictive information or any form of 
reliability.119 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the of-
ficer’s sole basis for suspicion was grounded on the information pro-
vided from the anonymous caller.120  This is different from a known 
informant because the known informant has a reputation and is re-
sponsible if the allegations are not correct.121  However, an anony-
mous tip that is sufficiently corroborated and shows reliability to 
prove reasonable suspicion is enough for a lawful search.122  The 
 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 J.L., 529 U.S. at 268. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 J.L., 529 U.S. at 269. 
120 Id. at 270. 
121 Id. If the tip is from an unknown informant and is inaccurate then the police are unable 
to take action and issue punishment.  However, when the tip is from someone who the police 
is familiar with and he passes on wrong information then the police can give the necessary 
punishment.  Id. 
122 Id.  In analyzing the tip at issue, the Court in J.L. found: 
The anonymous call concerning J.L. provided no predictive information 
and therefore left the police without means to test the informant’s 
knowledge or credibility.  That the allegation about the gun turned out to 
be correct does not suggest that the officers, prior to the frisks, had a rea-
sonable basis for suspecting J.L. of engaging in unlawful conduct.  The 
reasonableness of official suspicion must be measured by what the offic-
12
Touro Law Review, Vol. 32 [2016], No. 4, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss4/8
2016 THE BIG PICTURE 819 
Court stated that the tip lacked reliability and the phone call did not 
provide information to predict J.L.’s next step.123  The fact that J.L. 
possessed a firearm was not enough to provide the police with a rea-
sonable basis to stop and frisk.124  The informant failed to provide 
how he knew about the gun or how and why he knew J.L. was in pos-
session of this information.125  Therefore, the Court held that the 
search violated J.L.’s Fourth Amendment right because the anony-
mous tip lacked reliability.126 
C.  Navarette v. California 
In Navarette v. California,127 the United States Supreme Court 
decided the issue of whether the defendant’s Fourth Amendment 
rights were violated when an officer had reasonable suspicion, 
through a tip, to believe the driver was intoxicated but did not ob-
serve the action himself.128  In Navarette, the Mendocino County 911 
dispatcher received a phone call from an eyewitness in the neighbor-
ing town that stated a Silver Ford license plate 8D94925 was south-
bound on Highway 1 at mile marker 88 and ran someone off the road 
five minutes prior to the call.129  A member of the California High-
way Patrol then spotted the vehicle at mile maker 69 and pulled the 
vehicle over.130  A scent of marijuana was present and upon investi-
gation, thirty pounds of marijuana were discovered in the truck.131  
The petitioners sought to establish that the evidence should be sup-
pressed because the search violated the Fourth Amendment due to 
lack of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.132 
When evaluating if the officer had reasonable suspicion to 
 
ers knew before they conducted their search.  All the police had to go on 
in this case was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant 
who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis 
for believing he had inside information about J.L. 
   Id. at 271. 
123 J.L., 529 U.S. at 271. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014). 
128 Id. at 1686. 
129 Id. at 1686-87. 
130 Id. at 1687. 
131 Id. 
132 Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687. 
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conduct a stop, the Court examined how the tip was established.133  
The Court determined that the content of the tip came from the eye-
witness victim of the reckless driving.134  In addition, the officer was 
able to corroborate the truck’s location, direction, time, and descrip-
tion.135  This corroboration provided the police with a reasonable be-
lief that the 911 caller was telling the truth.136  The Court found that a 
contemporaneous report is typically treated as reliable because it re-
futes the chances of a deliberate misrepresentation.137  Furthermore, 
the phone call was enough to justify a stop without the officer observ-
ing additional reckless driving due to the nature of the alleged crimi-
nal conduct of running someone off the road.138  When applying the 
totality of the circumstances, the Court found that since the tipster 
stated another vehicle ran her off the road, there was an implication 
that the informant knew the driver was acting in a reckless manner.139  
The police were able to successfully confirm the truck’s location at 
mile maker 69, which was just 19 miles away from the initial sight.140  
This distance correctly followed the timeline of events from when the 
informant called 911.141 
The Navarette Court found that a reliable tip alone is not 
enough to justify an investigative stop.142  The tip must be enough to 
create reasonable suspicion that the crime is ongoing as opposed to 
one isolated incident that is completed.143  Reasonable suspicion is 
measured on both the factual and practical considerations used by a 
reasonable prudent person.144  Under these circumstances, the Court 
examined various driving behaviors that are related to drunk driv-
ing.145  Furthermore, in the recent years, 911 systems have been ad-
vanced to include features that make it possible to identify and trace 
callers to prevent the risk of false reports.146  An individual may face 
 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 1689. 
136 Id. 
137 Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1690. 
143 Id. 
144 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996). 
145 Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1690-91. 
146 Id. at 1689. 
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prosecution if it was established that a false report was made.147  
Regulatory and technological developments, have clearly aided law 
enforcement in evaluating the genuineness of an anonymous tip.148 
The Court distinguished this case from J.L..149  Here, the 911 
caller provided the police with sufficient indicia of reliability that she 
was run off the road by providing accurate details such as the driver’s 
location.150  In J.L., however, the anonymous caller merely provided 
police with information that a male wearing a plaid shirt was in pos-
session of a gun, which was not enough to establish reasonable suspi-
cion because of lack of a prediction for future behavior.151  In 
Navarette, it was reasonable to believe that the informant knew that 
the driver was acting recklessly when she was driven off the road.152  
Therefore, the Court held that the stop was justifiable because the 
contents of the phone call gave reason to believe the informant was 
credible, when she provided the license plate number, make of the 
vehicle, and location.153 
Navarette was a 5-4 decision, and Justice Scalia authored the 
dissenting opinion.154  Scalia’s concern was that law enforcement of-
ficials follow the decisions of the Supreme Court, especially when it 
involves traffic stops.155  The new rule that states “[s]o long as the 
caller identifies where the car is, anonymous claims of a single in-
stance of possible careless or reckless driving, called in to 911, will 
support a traffic stop.”156  Justice Scalia believed that this rule departs 
from the view of the Framers of The Constitution.157  The dissenting 
opinion noted that the information from the anonymous tip should be 
with such particularity that it would not be known to an ordinary per-
son.158  For example, any individual witnessing a vehicle traveling on 
a highway in a certain direction may be certain that the vehicle will 
 
147 Id. at 1690. 
148 Id. 
149 See supra Section IV.B for a discussion of J.L. 
150 Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1688-89. 
151 J.L., 529 U.S. at 268. 
152 Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689. 
153 Id. at 1692. 
154 Id. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
155 Id. 
156 Id.  
157 Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This is likely because anonymous, 
unsubstantiated tips cast a wide net that in turn creates the intended protection of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
158 Id. at 1693. 
15
Dadiego: The Big Picture
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2016
822 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 32 
reach another point by a particular time.159  The dissent feared that 
this rule would open the door to other new rules that would slip fur-
ther away from the original intent of the Fourth Amendment. 
D. United States v. Simmons 
In United States v. Simmons,160 the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals discussed whether police had reasonable suspicion, based on 
a 911 call, to stop and search the defendant.161  In Simmons, the po-
lice received a call that stated an assault was in progress and a black 
male with a gray sweatshirt and black jacket may be in possession of 
a weapon.162  When the officers arrived, they discovered a group of 
people that denied that anyone was injured.163  In addition, there was 
no evidence that an assault took place.164  Upon entering the building, 
a man who matched the description, approached the officers with his 
hands in his pockets and would not remove them when asked.165  One 
of the officers grabbed the man’s pocket and felt a gun.166  Next, the 
officers searched the defendant and discovered two loaded guns; he 
was placed under arrest.167 
The court determined that reasonable suspicion was estab-
lished because the anonymous tip reported an assault and the police, 
upon arrival at the scene, spotted a group of individuals present at the 
time and location described by the informant.168  The court found that 
when the defendant failed to remove his hands from his pocket, the 
officer had reasonable cause to grab Simmons’s pockets to ensure his 
safety.169  The court applied the standard set forth in Terry, in which 
the Supreme Court held that when a police officer observes unusual 
conduct, which leads him to believe criminal activity is present or the 
person may be armed, he is permitted to make reasonable inquires.170  
 
159 Id. 
160 560 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2009). 
161 Id. at 101. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Simmons, 560 F.3d at 101. 
166 Id.  
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 103. 
169 Id. at 102. 
170 Simmons, 560 F.3d at 103; Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31. 
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When applying Terry, the court examined whether a particularized 
and objective basis for suspicion of legal wrongdoing under the to-
tality of the circumstances existed.171 
The defendant unsuccessfully relied on the Supreme Court’s 
holding in J.L.172  The court reasoned that this case is significantly 
different from J.L. because here, the anonymous informant reported 
an assault with a weapon that was in progress, while J.L. merely in-
volved a tip that an individual was in possession of a gun.173  The 
court noted that an anonymous 911 call made with the purpose of re-
porting an ongoing emergency demonstrates a higher degree of relia-
bility and therefore a reduced amount of corroboration is required.174 
E. Significance of the Federal Approach in relation to 
People v. Argyris 
The totality of the circumstances standard applied by the fed-
eral courts differs from the Aguilar-Spinelli standard that is used by 
New York courts.  In applying the totality of the circumstances 
standard, federal courts give deference to law enforcement and their 
efforts.  However, an individual’s right against an unreasonable 
search is eroded because law enforcement may be able to conjure up 
various “conceivable reasons” to justify a search that may be deemed 
unreasonable. 
The Aguilar-Spinelli standard, commonly utilized by New 
York courts, expands on the protections initially provided by the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  This standard 
places a demand on law enforcement, with regard to anonymous tips.  
At the very least, police officers have to establish that their tip was 
reliable enough to justify a stop and possible search. 
The two standards utilized by the federal and New York 
courts are at far opposite ends of the spectrum.  Should courts afford 
deference to law enforcement, or chip away at the Fourth Amend-
ment rights of an individual?  New York courts have insisted that an 
individual’s right against unreasonable search and seizure can trump 
law enforcement’s duty to combat crime and promote public safety.  
 
171 Simmons, 560 F.3d at 103; United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting 
Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18 (1981)). 
172 See supra Part IV.B for a discussion of J.L. 
173 Simmons, 560 F.3d at 104. 
174 Id. 
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There may be no middle ground between the two standards. 
V. NEW YORK STATE APPROACH 
This Section will discuss New York State’s approach to 
anonymous tips.  The New York State Constitution provides that 
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no war-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched . . . 
.”175  In other words, a warrantless search is not permitted solely on 
the basis of information provided by an informant where there is no 
indication of how that information was obtained even if the police 
had been able to confirm the tip through their own knowledge.  In or-
der for police to conduct a warrantless search, there must be confir-
mation of sufficient details suggestive of, or directly related to, the 
criminal activity to reach the conclusion that the informer did not 
simply pass along a rumor or attempt to frame the individual.  The 
following cases demonstrate how New York courts approach situa-
tions where anonymous tips were provided and the standard used to 
determine whether a stop is reasonable within the Fourth Amendment 
while applying the Aguilar-Spinelli test. 
In People v. Johnson,176 the New York Court of Appeals was 
asked to determine the minimum factual showing required to support 
probable cause in New York.177  In Johnson, Joseph Di Prospro in-
formed police officers that Bolivar Abreu was responsible for the 
death of Raymundo Alcantara.178  When questioned by police, Abreu 
denied having any information regarding the homicide.179  However, 
Abreu ultimately connected Di Prospro and the defendant by disclos-
ing a conversation about the crime.180  The defendant was then arrest-
ed and sought to establish that his arrest was unlawful because the 
police relied upon hearsay from an individual who did not meet the 
requirement of the Aguilar-Spinelli test.181  The court stated that 
 
175 N.Y. CONST. art 1, § 12. 
176 488 N.E.2d 439 (N.Y. 1985). 
177 Id. at 442. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Johnson, 488 N.E.2d at 442. 
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probable cause may be established through hearsay information as 
long as it meets the requirements of Aguilar-Spinelli.182  In other 
words, the informant must be reliable and have a basis of knowledge 
for hearsay information to support a probable cause determination.183 
Here, the Court of Appeals found that Abreu, the informant, 
had a sufficient basis of knowledge because he was able to provide 
information to the police based upon his own personal observation by 
stating that “during the robbery Di Prospro had pulled out of gun . . . 
and that during the struggle Di Prospro fired the gun at the proprie-
tor.”184  Defense counsel argued that notwithstanding this statement, 
probable cause was not established because the State failed to show 
that Abreu was a reliable informant – the other prong in the Aguilar-
Spinelli test.185  The court stated that an informant can be considered 
reliable based on the informant’s past performance, a verification un-
der oath, or an admission against penal interest.186  In Johnson, the 
record failed to establish Abreu as a reliable informant due to lack of 
previous performances.187  In addition, the statement was not given 
under oath.188  The court determined that the Aguilar-Spinelli test was 
not satisfied and the only way probable cause could be established in 
this case was to apply the totality of the circumstances standard from 
Gates.189  However, New York declined to adopt this standard.190  
The court reasoned that the New York State Constitution was in con-
formity with the Fourth Amendment.191  Thus, the New York Court 
of Appeals determined when hearsay information is provided in a 
warrantless search, the Aguilar-Spinelli test must be satisfied.192  In 
this case, the prosecution wanted to apply the totality of the circum-
stances approach because ultimately, the tip was reliable.  However, 
outcome determinative tips should not be considered solely for their 
result. 
In People v. Elwell, the New York Court of Appeals deter-
 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Johnson, 488 N.E.2d at 442. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 443. 
189 Id. at 444. 
190 Id. at 445. 
191 Johnson, 488 N.E.2d at 445. 
192 Id. 
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mined whether a warrantless search is permitted when the informant 
failed to disclose how the information, which was personal in nature 
and not suggestive of criminal activity, was acquired.193  However, 
the police were able to confirm the information through their own ob-
servations.194  In Elwell, Charles Hancock, an investigator, received a 
phone call from a reliable informant whom he had interacted with on 
prior occasions.195  The informant stated the two defendants were in 
possession of a .25 caliber automatic pistol, operating a particular ve-
hicle, and would be departing from a specific area.196  However, the 
informant failed to reveal how he obtained that specific infor-
mation.197  Hancock, along with a police investigator, decided to pur-
sue this lead and located the two defendants in a vehicle.198  They 
stopped the vehicle and stated they had information that a loaded 
firearm was in their possession.199  Upon investigation, the police dis-
covered the firearm under the front seat, out of plain sight.200 
The court determined that in order for police observation to 
establish probable cause, which permits a warrantless search based on 
an informer’s failing to disclose the source of knowledge, it is insuf-
ficient to merely supply a large amount of information about non-
criminal activity.201  The court reasoned that probable cause is estab-
lished when details suggest or directly relate to criminal activity.202  
This is simply to prevent an informant from passing along a rumor or 
attempting to frame someone.203  An informant is considered to be re-
liable when the officer can confirm prior situations of reliability or 
through personal observation that the tip corroborates the informant’s 
information to prove he was telling the truth.204  It follows that when 
the basis of the informant’s knowledge is not given, personal police 
observation corroborative of data received from the informant should 
be regarded as sufficient only when the police observe facts sugges-
 
193 Elwell, 406 N.E.2d at 473. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 Elwell, 406 N.E.2d at 473. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 473. 
201 Id. at 474. 
202 Id. 
203 Elwell, 406 N.E.2d at 473. 
204 Id. at 474. 
20
Touro Law Review, Vol. 32 [2016], No. 4, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss4/8
2016 THE BIG PICTURE 827 
tive of criminal activity.205  The court held that since the police failed 
to observe criminal activity, they had no authority to stop or search 
the defendant.206 
Judge Jasen’s dissenting opinion suggests that the information 
provided by the informant was sufficient because it was confirmed by 
the officer’s own observations.207  Additionally, he noted the police 
officers acted reasonably to stop the vehicle because they possessed 
the necessary information and were able to verify its veracity.208  Fur-
thermore, he criticized the majority for striking down reasonable and 
prudent law enforcement efforts that were used to protect members of 
society.209 
In People v. Moore, the New York Court of Appeals reassert-
ed the principle established by the United States Supreme Court in 
Florida v. J.L. that “[a]n anonymous tip cannot provide reasonable 
suspicion to justify a seizure, except where the tip contains predictive 
information—such as information suggestive of criminal behavior—
so that the police can test the reliability of the tip.”210  In Moore, two 
police officers received an anonymous telephone tip advising them 
that an 18-year-old black male was carrying a gun and wearing a gray 
jacket and red hat was involved in a dispute.211  The officers arrived 
at the scene a minute later and spotted the male but failed to observe 
the dispute described in the tip.212  Next, the officers exited the vehi-
cle and approached the defendant who walked away.213  They imme-
diately drew their guns and yelled to the defendant not to move.214  
The defendant kept walking but eventually put his hands up.215  
While he was putting his hands up, he made a movement towards his 
waistband.216  The officers searched him and discovered a gun in his 
jacket.217  The defendant moved to suppress the gun.218 
 
205 Id. at 475. 
206 Id. at 478. 
207 Id. at 480 (Jasen, J., dissenting). 
208 Elwell, 406 N.E.2d at 480 (Jason, J., dissenting). 
209 Id. 
210 Moore, 847 N.E.2d at 1143. 
211 Id. at 1141-42. 
212 Id. at 1142. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 Moore, 847 N.E.2d at 1142. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
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The court found the police officer ultimately failed to exercise 
the common law duty to inquire.219  They did not develop reasonable 
suspicion until the moment the defendant made a movement towards 
his waist.220  Therefore, when the police first ordered the defendant to 
raise his hands, they did not have reasonable suspicion.  The court 
noted that an anonymous tip only allows reasonable suspicion when 
the tip provides information that suggests predictive information con-
cerning criminal behavior.221  Here, the anonymous tip failed to pro-
vide an accurate display of alleged criminal activity and failed to 
provide predictive information.222  In addition, the defendant’s walk-
ing away from the police failed to establish cause for the police to 
stop the defendant at gunpoint because the anonymous tip only 
prompted a common law right of inquiry.223  Police may not detain 
individuals to question them without reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity.224  The court, relying on the United States Supreme Court’s 
holding in J.L., found that the tip must be reliable in asserting an ille-
gality instead of just a tendency used to identify a person.225  The tip 
at issue however failed to provide predictive information or indicate 
criminal activity because the tip involved a man with a gun, and 
when the police arrived at the scene one minute after the call, neither 
a man with a gun was present nor was there an ongoing dispute.226  
The anonymous tip did not provide the proper corroboration for the 
search and seizure to be valid.227  Thus, it is evident that the court is 
protecting individuals from false accusations for merely being in a 
certain place without any indication of criminal activity. 
In People v. Rios, a detective received a document with an 
anonymous tip about an individual who possessed a gun.228  The po-
lice received this tip through a program that was designed for indi-
viduals to anonymously report the locations of illegal guns.229  The 
 
219 Id. 
220 Moore, 847 N.E.2d at 1142. 
221 Id. at 1143; see J.L., 529 U.S. at 271 (holding that an anonymous tip that a black male 
was standing on a corner wearing a plaid shirt and carrying a gun was insufficient to prove 
reasonable suspicion to allow police to conduct a legal stop and frisk). 
222 Moore, 847 N.E.2d at 1143. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. 
226 Id. 
227 Moore, 847 N.E.2d at 1141. 
228 Rios, 898 N.Y.S.2d at 799. 
229 Id. 
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tip provided that a black male, 23 years of age, and 150 pounds in 
weight was in possession of an automobile that contained a gun under 
the driver’s seat.230  The anonymous report stated that the automobile 
was a gray four-door Pontiac and provided the license plate as well as 
an address as to where the automobile would be located.231  The de-
tective was unaware who provided the tip or how that individual ob-
tained the information.232  Upon investigation, the detective discov-
ered that the vehicle was registered to the address provided in the 
tip.233  Next, the detectives went to the location and saw a vehicle 
which matched the description as well as the person from the descrip-
tion.234  The two detectives approached the vehicle and observed the 
defendant was acting nervous and fidgeting.235  They asked the de-
fendant to step out of the vehicle and at this point they did not ob-
serve anything that would be considered criminal activity.236  Eventu-
ally, the defendant admitted he had a gun in the vehicle.237 
The court relied on J.L. to determine whether the search was 
proper.238  As stated above, an anonymous tip alone is not sufficient 
to justify a seizure.239  The court reasoned that because the identity of 
the person and the basis of the tip were unknown, anyone could have 
reported the tip for any reason such as receiving an award.240  This tip 
was not considered to be any more reliable than other anonymous 
tips.241  Therefore, the seizure was improper because the anonymous 
tip did not corroborate criminal activity.242 
VI. RECOMMENDATION FOR CHANGE IN NEW YORK LAW 
Anonymous tips provide police with information they may 
not ordinarily be able to obtain on their own.  However, use of anon-
ymous tips raises possible Fourth Amendment violations.  Currently, 
 
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. 
233 Rios, 898 N.Y.S.2d at 799. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. at 800. 
237 Id. 
238 Rios, 898 N.Y.S.2d at 803. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. at 804. 
242 Id. at 805. 
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the Federal and New York State courts have different approaches to 
determine when it is reasonable for law enforcement to stop an indi-
vidual after receiving an anonymous tip.  The Federal approach ap-
plies a “totality of the circumstances” test, which examines all the 
facts of each individual situation.243  On the other hand, the height-
ened standard in New York State requires the two prong Aguilar-
Spinelli criteria to be satisfied in order for police to rely on an anon-
ymous source before it is reasonable to stop an individual. 
Since Aguilar-Spinelli requires facts to specify the inform-
ant’s basis of knowledge and credibility, it is nearly impossible for an 
anonymous tip to appropriately meet the requirements.  Accordingly, 
only a handful of states still adhere to Aguilar-Spinelli.244  Practically, 
the only way for an anonymous tip to be sufficient to provide the po-
lice with reasonable suspicion to “stop and frisk” in New York is if 
the Court of Appeals abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli test and adopted 
the “totality of the circumstances” approach.  Gates provides the to-
tality of the circumstances to allow an anonymous tip to successfully 
establish probable cause if the police are able to corroborate some of 
the informant’s information.245  Information used to corroborate an 
informant’s tip includes a license plate number, a description of 
events or individuals, and an accurate description of future events.  
Under the totality of the circumstances test, the police would be able 
to legally stop and search more individuals based on an anonymous 
tip. 
Argyris opened the door to the possibility of New York’s 
adoption of the totality of the circumstances approach in stating that 
police can conduct lawful stops under either the totality of the cir-
cumstances test or the Aguilar-Spinelli test.  However, the court in 
 
243 Gates, 482 U.S. at 230-31. 
244 Besides New York, the states that still apply Aguilar-Spinelli include: Alaska, Massa-
chusetts, Tennessee, Vermont, and Washington.  State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 322 (Alaska 
1985) (holding the court is not persuaded to follow the Federal precedent and abandon Agui-
lar-Spinelli); Commonwealth v. Banville, 931 N.E.2d 457, 464 (Mass. 2010) (holding  that 
“Massachusetts has retained the two-prong reliability-basis of knowledge Aguilar-Spinelli 
test”); State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 436 (Tenn. 1989) (stating that “we adopt the two-
pronged standard voiced in Aguilar and Spinelli as the standard by which probable cause will 
be measured to see if the issuance of a search warrant is proper . . . .”); State v. Goldberg, 
872 A.2d 378, 381-82 (Vt. 2005) (holding “[t]he Aguilar-Spinelli standard strikes an appro-
priate balance between individual Vermonters’ right to privacy and the police’s important 
interest in preventing crime”); State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 141 (Wash. 1984) (stating that 
“[w]e are not persuaded by the United States Supreme Court's rationale for departing from 
the Aguilar-Spinelli standard.”). 
245 Gates, 482 U.S. at 230-31. 
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Argyris failed to take the additional step of replacing Aguilar-Spinelli 
with the totality of the circumstances approach.  Argyris had the po-
tential to be a ground-breaking case that aligned New York’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence with the majority of the states in applying 
the totality of the circumstances anaylsis.  Without this change, New 
York is imprudently providing individuals with too much leniency 
from governmental searches to the detriment of the general public.  
Aguilar-Spinelli makes law enforcement’s job more difficult, but 
confers additional Fourth Amendment protections that the United 
States Constitution does not provide.  On the other hand, the totality 
of the circumstances makes law enforcement’s job easier and pro-
vides an individual with fewer Fourth Amendment protections.  
Adopting a totality of the circumstances approach would still provide 
individuals with Fourth Amendment protections.  At the same time, it 
would allow law enforcement to use anonymous tips, provided all the 
circumstances in the situation are able to establish probable cause—
or maybe even reasonable suspicion.246 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Amendment provides individuals with privacy 
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.  Law enforcement 
officials may, however, reasonably detain and search an individual by 
successfully establishing the existence of probable cause to believe 
that there is criminal wrongdoing.  The Supreme Court initially estab-
lished the Aguilar-Spinelli test to determine when an anonymous tip 
allows law enforcement to conduct a warrantless stop.  The United 
States Supreme Court ultimately found that this standard focused 
heavily on the constitutional rights of individuals and prevented law 
enforcement from adequately performing their duties in preventing 
crime.  Eventually, the Court replaced Aguilar-Spinelli with the total-
ity of the circumstances approach, which provides law enforcement 
with greater flexibility to conduct a warrantless search from an anon-
ymous tip. 
New York is only one of six states that has yet to adopt the 
more practical totality of the circumstances standard.  The New York 
Court of Appeals in Argyris may not have made the leap to imple-
ment the totality of the circumstances approach, but it took the step to 
 
246 Arygris, 27 N.E.3d at 438 (Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring). 
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open the door to adopt it in the future.  If an anonymous tip provides 
police with reliable information such as a license plate number, the 
type of vehicle, a description of the individual, or the next steps of 
the possible defendant, such as it did in Argyris, the totality of the 
circumstances should apply and allow police to conduct a lawful 
search.  Perhaps a case in the near future will provide the New York 
courts with the necessary facts to adopt the totality of the circum-
stances standard. 
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